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Abstract 
The paper uses function analysis to complement the analytical framework Institutions of 
Sustainability and to apply it for the analysis of the role of institutions for the 
multifunctionality of landscapes. This combination of conceptual tools is evaluated through 
their application to the case of landscape development in a sub-region of the Algarve, 
Portugal. In view of this case study it is suggested to complement the Institutions of  
Sustainability framework: case and transaction specific contextual factors should be included. 
The paper suggests to look at cross-jurisdictional agency features, cross-function, -transaction 
and -institutional commonalities, and interconnections as well as to include a dynamic 
dimension of institutional and physical time lags governing human-ecosystem relations. 
Keywords: Multifunctional Landscape, Institutions, Portugal, European Integration 
JEL Codes: N54, Q56, O18 
 
Acknowledgements 
The author is grateful for valuable comments and corrections by Volker Beckmann, Annette Hurrelmann, Tim 
Marshall, Katharina Rauchenecker and Christian Schleyer. 
© Andreas Thiel 
2  Andreas Thiel 
1 Introduction 
This paper is to contribute to the discussion of the role that the analysis of institutions and 
governance can play for understanding the development of “landscapes” and their 
functionality. The term multifunctionality has been conceptualised in a variety of ways. Often 
clearly interest-laden, political motivations seem to explain these differences1. Also, 
academics deal with it from a variety of perspectives. Vatn treats multifunctionality as 
analytical concept drawn from economic analysis and equates it with jointness of production 
or the fact that “inputs cannot be assigned specifically to each output” (Vatn 2001: 5). Durand 
et al. expand this conception to a normative category as “new paradigm….to develop policies 
that stimulate rural entrepreneurship and the supply of public goods” (Durand et al. 2003: 13). 
Hagedorn similarly describes multifunctionality as jointness of production specific to agri-
environmental practices and developed the framework “Institutions of Sustainability” (IoS) 
(Hagedorn et al. 2002) for their analysis. Here we adopt Wiggering et al.’s conception 
seemingly coming from environmental management which transposes the concept to overall 
landscapes and implies a normative and a positive dimension (Wiggering et al. 2003). 
Enlarging the scope of the concept is justified with the fact that any “type of landscape” fulfils 
the same functions as rural agricultural zones although they feature with different intensity 
(similar to Wiggering et al. 2003). Moreover, this approach seems to be justified in a time 
when in the European Union agriculture is supposed to broaden its objectives and mix of 
functions substantially (see for example Durand and Van Huylenbroeck 2003). Specifically 
the paper aims at evaluating the value of the IoS framework for the analysis of 
multifunctional landscapes as defined by Wiggering et al. (2003). 
A whole range of changes occurs in the relation between society and the environment - and 
therefore its multifunctionality - once a territory and its inhabitants are under the influence of 
European integration. The IoS framework focuses the case study analysis in this paper on the 
role property rights, governance structures, and actors play in one empirical case of the 
‘production’ of (multifunctional) landscapes. The paper will go about this task in four 
sections: firstly, the conceptual background will be dealt with. The concept of 
multifunctionality and related concepts, a framework for analysing landscape functions 
(function analysis), and the IoS framework is presented.  
                                                 
1  Hagedorn (2005) provides an overview of eight different ways of interpreting the concept, their 
corresponding foundation and motivation. 
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Second, this combination of conceptual tools is applied for analysing the way the 
multifunctionality of landscapes was shaped in the empirical case of a subregion of the 
Algarve in Portugal. The question will be how the described configuration of actors, property 
rights, and governance structures contributed to relative changes in functionality of the 
landscape between the beginning of the seventies and the present. Answering this question is 
to provide input for, third, reflecting about the analytical toolkit previously devised and 
specifically the IoS framework. Forth, suggestions will be made on how to complement the 
IoS framework for a dynamic analysis of the way multifunctional landscapes are shaped. 
Concluding the paper a summary of the key argument is presented. 
2 Conceptual Background 
2.1 Multifunctionality and its Analysis 
Wiggering et al. (2003) adopt a twofold definition of the concept of multifunctionality of 
landscapes: firstly, a descriptive/positive conception of multifunctionality is presented in 
terms of technological jointness of production (functions) of landscape that actions impinge 
upon. Translated to social theory this positive conception describes the fact that human 
actions have unintended, secondary or indirect implications for the physical environment.  
Secondly, they introduce a normative definition of how multifunctional landscapes 
perform. Normative multifunctionality is conceptualised as “…an attempt […] at carrying out 
and implementing the concept of sustainable development in the specific case of land use and 
landscape development”2 (Wiggering et al. 2003: 9). Multifunctional landscapes should fulfil 
normative standards, such as long-term conservation of biotic, abiotic, and cultural resources, 
economic welfare of the land users, social perspectives for the rural population and 
maintenance of technical and cultural infrastructure in rural areas. These standards have to be 
regionally differentiated. They have to be adapted according to socio-economic, 
environmental and landscape type criteria, and the valuation of different functions varies in 
reaction to contingent demands and standards of information/knowledge (Wiggering 1997). 
                                                 
2  In relation to the environment Wiggering et al. (2003) equate sustainable development with certain 
management rules: use of renewable resources may not exceed their substitution or subsitution rate; the 
release of harmful substances may not exceed the capability of natural systems to absorb and to compensate. 
4  Andreas Thiel 
Wiggering et al. (2003) furthermore make certain normative prescriptions with regard to 
institutional structures (property rights/governance constellation)3. In contrast, this paper 
distances itself from these normative procedural prescriptions. Instead, the aim is to 
understand what configurations shape (positive) multifunctionality of landscapes, how this 
can be analysed best and what configurations of elements facilitate the emergence of 
multifunctional landscapes in the normative sense. Some of these elements may well be 
included in Wiggering et al.’s prescriptions. Before introducing function analysis landscape 
functions are briefly defined and the concepts of ‘landscape’ and ‘land use’, ‘functions of 
landscapes’ and ‘demand for land use’ are related to each other. 
Wascher (2004) defines landscapes as “…spatially defined units which character and 
functions are defined by the complex and region-specific interaction of natural processes with 
human activities that are driven by economic, social, and environmental forces and values”. 
This definition illustrates the heightened complexity that the IoS is confronted with in the 
analysis of multifunctionality of landscapes. Land use is one human activity that is undertaken 
in this landscape and that can fulfil various functions. De Groot (2004) equates landscape 
functions with ecosystem functions. They are defined as “the capacity of natural processes 
and components to provide goods and services that satisfy human needs, directly or 
indirectly” (De Groot 1992: 7). These functions play a role for the eco-system itself as well as 
for humans. They are interrelated and overlap which means that the quality and features of 
one function necessarily have an impact on the quality and features of others. Therefore, 
changes usually relate to more or less all functions, as well as the ecosystem and landscape 
changes. Multifunctionality de- (or pre-) scribes the number of functions that landscapes fulfil 
and their quality. As shown in Figure 1, De Groot (2004) proposes five categories of 
ecosystem functions. All goods and services that people demand for (land use being one of 
them) can be reduced to them as well as they are in a dialectical relationship to human 
demand. De Groot (2004) as much as Wascher (2004) introduce what could be called a 
biological view of landscapes. They downplay its aesthetic value and omit its significance for 
people’s identity4. In Figure 1 ecosystem functions provide ecosystem goods and services 
                                                 
3  They target the process in which agreement on land use is to be achieved and property rights are defined and 
allocated. All demands on landscapes are considered simultaneously, all demands are seen as legitimate, 
extra-regional and large scale demands are to be included, property rights need to be clearly defined and 
decision competence is to be decentralised in line with the subsidiarity principle (Wiggering et al. 2003: 9ff.).  
4  Bioregionalists for example argue for an institutional configuration that builds on the identity that people 
associate with places and landscapes (McGinnis 1999). 
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which imply physical interventions. They restructure ecosystems in terms of functions and 
therefore also the services provided. For the purposes of this paper De Groot’s (2004) 
categories of landscape functions are used. For analysing the functionality of a landscape the 
methodological challenge has to be tackled to judge the way in which a landscape/ecosystem 
performs in relation to ecosystem functions.  
 
Ecosystem 
goods & 
services 
Ecosystem 
structure and 
services 
Physical Intervention 
Ecosystem functions: 
1. Regulation 
- Relate to capacity of natural and semi-natural ecosystems to 
regulate essential ecological processes and life support systems 
through bio-geochemical cycles and other biospheric processes 
2. Habitat 
- Provide refuge and reproduction habitat to flora and fauna and 
thereby contribute to (in situ) conservation of biological and 
genetic diversity and evolutionary processes 
3. Production 
- Photosynthesis and nutrient uptake by autotrophs converts energy 
and nutrients into carbohydrates which are then used to create 
biomass 
4. Information 
- Natural ecosystems provide an essential ‘reference function’ and 
contribute to the maintenance of human health (opportunities for 
reflection, recreation, spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, 
aesthetic experience 
5. Carrier 
- Human activities require space and a suitable substrate (soil) or 
medium (air/water) to support associated infrastructure
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Analysis of human – ecosystem relationships5
Source: Author, adaptation of De Groot (2004). 
2.2 The “Institutions of Sustainability” Framework 
At various occasions Hagedorn proposes to analyse multifunctionality of agriculture through 
an analytical framework he terms “Institutions of Sustainability” (IoS) (Hagedorn 2005: 10f.; 
2003: 51f.; detailed in Hagedorn et al. 2002; Gatzweiler and Hagedorn 2002). In the IoS 
framework “features of transactions and properties of actors are considered as determinants of 
institutional innovation leading to property rights on ecosystem functions and governance 
                                                 
5  For a more detailed overview of ecosystem/landscape functions see De Groot (2004). 
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structures for natural resources” (Hagedorn 2005: 7f.). Contextual elements are for example 
the social embeddedness of the elements, the dynamic view of institutional change and the 
level of analysis. The IoS framework is to contribute to “institutional change for making 
multifunctionality of landscapes work” and therefore, Hagedorn (2005: 4f.) sees it as a “tool 
for increasing sustainability”. Hence the application of the IoS framework has a positive as 
well as a normative side to it. Based on positive analysis good design principles are to be 
identified that characterise families of (normative) Institutions of Sustainability whose socio-
ecologic interactions are relatively more sustainable than others. In line with this process 
Hagedorn (2005) perceives sustainable development as “a comprehensive process of 
searching, learning and gaining experience”. Its results are “adequate institutions […] 
effective in the various areas of society” (ibid.: 15). Building on a pool of knowledge about 
institutional configurations that perform better in terms of sustainability than others and which 
has been acquired through empirical work. The framework does not rely on any specific mode 
of calculation by actors such as logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989), rationality 
or bounded rationality (Ostrom et al. 1994).  
In the positive sense the IoS framework analyses already existing configurations which are 
either the product of long term processes of institutional formation, which emerge 
spontaneously or which are the product of intentional institutional design. Institutions or the 
institutional configuration “…are perceived as sets of interrelated rules governing given 
aspects of social life which are acknowledged (or sanctioned) by all or some members of 
society. They regulate relationships among individuals and between the social and ecological 
systems, i.e. rights and duties as well as costs and benefits of actions. Therefore institutions 
link social and ecological systems” (Gatzweiler and Hagedorn 2003: 3). They interrelate 
actors, socio-ecologic transactions, governance structures and property rights. Institution 
building is described as evolution and co-evolution, a process which is dynamic, complex and 
a result of co-adaptation (idem 2002). Before detailing the description, the framework is 
graphically reproduced in Figure 2. 
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Institutions of 
environmental 
sustainability 
 
 
Property rights to nature 
components 
 
 
Governance structures for 
agri-environmental relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction between nature 
and actors 
 
 
 
Properties of transactions 
 
 
 
Characteristics of actors Institutional performance 
Institutional innovation 
Figure 2: The Institutions of Sustainability (IoS) framework 
Source: Hagedorn et al. (2002). 
Hagedorn implicitly argues that governance cannot be explained independently by any of the 
elements constituting the IoS framework although the usual understanding of network 
governance6 suggests this. Instead its contingent and dialectical relation to the other elements 
(features of the transactions and property rights) have to be taken into account.  
The IoS framework has been developed specifically based on thinking about  
agri-environmental practices. Therefore, it has to be answered on a conceptual level if the IoS 
framework can be transposed to activities shaping landscapes in general and what the 
implications of this transposition are. Based on Hagedorn’s (2005) definition of agri-
                                                 
6  A process of governing which differs from other forms of governing as it is no longer exclusively conducted 
by the state, but involves “all those activities of social, political and administrative actors that […] guide, 
steer, control, or manage society” (Kooiman 1993: 3).  
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environmental practices7 little doubt emerges that any human-ecosystem interference, for 
example, land coverage, conserving ecosystems, industries polluting soil, waters or air, 
reshaping landscapes for aesthetic purposes or using it for recreational purposes has similar 
characteristics. Obviously, the degree to which they feature these interactions varies in 
relation to features of functions and context. Consequently, conceptually the transposition of 
the IoS framework to other kinds of human-ecosystem interactions is legitimate. Therefore, 
the question becomes more significant if the IoS framework is adequate and practical to the 
analysis of institutional configurations shaping multifunctional landscapes due to diverse 
overlapping socio-ecological relations.  
The IoS framework evaluates transactions specifically with regard to their implications for 
environmental goods and services. It is not interested in the consequences of these 
transactions on other goods and services. Transactions regarding multifunctional agriculture 
are defined by Hagedorn et al. (2002) as producing environmental problems through 
production or consumption which implies a transaction between the farmer and the public or 
community concerned. Alternatively, they solve or diminish environmental problems and 
imply a transaction between the regulator and the farmer (see also Hagedorn et al. 2002: 6). 
Here we endeavour to examine the transferability of the IoS framework to the analysis of 
institutions governing multifunctional landscapes. As a consequence we have to broaden 
Hagedorn et al. (2002)’s definition of transactions. Transactions are therefore here defined as 
either producing or diminishing environmental problems (e.g. pollution of aquifers, sealing of 
soils or maintenance of habitats). Relating to environmental problems this definition 
implicitly considers a normative vision of the natural environment. Transactions are closely 
linked to the activities that cause environmental changes such as water abstraction or building 
activities. They impinge on other actors’ property rights and lead to the need for coordination 
with others than those producing the physical effect (see also the definition of transactions of 
                                                 
7  For Hagedorn (2005: 14) the agri-environmental relationship features “actor and resource characteristics 
..[where] …different (positive and negative) effects do not accrue to the same group, the resource used for 
harvesting and the resource degraded by that are not identical, processes by which the resource yields 
benefits and simultaneously causes harm are not easily understood by the heterogeneous actors and a 
common understanding of the groups involved is often lacking. The resource or the environmental medium 
often has no clear boundaries and positive (intended) effects and negative (non-intended, side) effects 
materialise in different environmental media and different geographical areas” (2005: 14). 
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Beckmann 2002)8. This distinguishes them from activities. In economic terms, coordination 
can be optimal or not. 
Transactions are mutually interdependent with the other elements that the IoS framework 
singles out. The characteristics of different types of actors are deeply intertwined with the 
transactions and underlying activities they are involved in9. The characteristics of actors are 
influenced but not predetermined by the transaction, as actors are able to learn from 
experience. For example, tourism enterprises or farmers reflect the physical conditions under 
which they pursue their activities. Furthermore, Hagedorn et al. (2002) single out governance 
structures for structures that supervise and sanction property rights to specific components of 
nature or that organise transactions10. Hagedorn et al. (2002) hereby refer to structures related 
to formal property rights such as plans, licensing regimes or legal rules, and the structures and 
entities striving to implement them. By specifying that property rights are defined only for 
components of nature Hagedorn (2005) takes account of the complex physical interrelations 
into which the exercise of property rights over pieces of nature are embedded. In other words, 
property rights to ecosystem components are always insufficiently defined in relation to 
effects they have on the overall ecosystem. Therefore, unaccounted for and unintended 
consequences are bound to happen as our knowledge of ecosystems is necessarily partial. 
Externalities similarly are bound to occur. The IoS framework understands property rights not 
only as disposition rights11 focusing on physical entities but in a more specific differentiated 
sense. The maintenance of property rights to components of nature furthermore implies 
transaction costs12. The term transaction costs is, in fact, somewhat inappropriate given the 
                                                 
8  This definition of transactions is distinct from those definitions of transactions used by either Williamson 
(1985: 1): “transfer of a good or a service over a technically separable interface”, and fundamentally different 
from Commons’ (1934, quoted in Richter and Furubotn 1999: 38): “transfer of property rights”. 
Williamson’s definition resembles the field for which it was initially defined, the organisation of industrial 
production where transactions are obviously perceived as not at all as complex and uncertain in their physical 
consequences as transactions directly related to ecosystems.  
9  Departing from Hagedorn et al. (2002) in the case study normative legitimacy is described in the context of 
actors as it varies with the characteristics of actors and not with immutable characteristics of transactions. 
10  In this case, Hagedorn adopts a definition of governance structures similar to that of Williamson (1998: 76) 
who defines governance as “the means by which order is accomplished in a relation by which potential 
conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains”. 
11  That is, rights to use, alter or alienate (Richter and Furubotn 1999: 82). 
12  Transactions necessarily have implications for property rights of others. Coordinating property rights imply 
“costs of running the economic system” (Arrow 1969: 48, quoted in Williamson 1991: 269) or transaction 
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terminology of Hagedorn which was described above. He equates transactions with socio-
ecological interactions as argued above. One would better describe them as ‘property rights 
costs’ or “costs of governance” (or costs of transactions in the sense of Williamson) 
(Williamson 1998; 1991). We assume they nonetheless depend on the characteristics of the 
socio-ecologic interaction as Hagedorn et al. (2002) continues to elaborate. The distribution of 
either partial property rights regarding one element of nature (specialisation - high transaction 
costs) or bundling them (low transaction costs) has implications for transactions costs 
(understood as property rights costs) as well as for either central (in case of division of 
property rights, specialisation) or decentral (bundling of property rights, one title for all 
functions of element) allocation. The IoS framework originally aims at describing transactions 
in a static situation; therefore, it does not include a category for costs of institutional change 
as described by Challen13.  
Here we use our transposition of Hagedorn’s definition of transactions (see above) to 
landscapes as ‘either producing or diminishing environmental problems and impinging on 
other people’s property rights’. Transaction costs are equated with governance costs. More 
details on the attributes of the categories IoS framework uses are provided elsewhere 
(Hagedorn et al. 2002; Hagedorn 2005; Gatzweiler and Hagedorn 2002).  
3 Applying the IoS Framework and Function Analysis to the Case Study 
In terms of ecosystem functions as suggested by De Groot (1992) the IoS framework has 
originally been devised for looking at agri-environmental practices. Therefore, it originally 
                                                                                                                                                        
costs. Challen (2000: 28) writes “transaction costs are the costs incurred in organising and coordinating 
human interaction”. Borrowing from Coase (1960: 15), he details: “the costs to discover who one wants to 
deal with, to inform them about the wish to deal with them, the terms on which one wants to deal with them, 
the costs of negotiating with them, drawing up a contract and monitoring it etc.”. In several texts Williamson 
therefore equates transaction costs with governance costs which depend on the form of governance (see e.g. 
Williamson 1998, 1991).  
13  Challen (2000: 7) aims to analyse institutional change and introduces dynamics as process-related transition 
costs, “that is, the costs of decision making for institutional change and the costs of implementing 
institutional reforms”. Transition costs obviously vary contingently depending on the status quo from which 
transition starts. Therefore, they introduce path dependency. These costs are not included as such in the 
analytic framework of Hagedorn, which therefore takes a static view. In the empirical case study following 
below we point towards costs of institutional change such as costs of implementation of e.g. altered formal 
property rights/ governance structures. 
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was employed to look at goods and services evolving from the ‘carrier function’ of 
ecosystems/landscapes. For applying the IoS framework to the multifunctionality of an 
overall landscape it has to be taken stock of how various functions of the ecosystem perform 
in the empirical situation of the case study. The features of the transactions, actors, property 
rights regimes and governance structures that impinge upon them have to be identified. It is 
not hard to imagine that the degree of complexity of such an analysis is enormous. Therefore, 
the subsequent case study focuses only on the principal changes in functions and transactions 
that have been identified as shaping landscape and determining its multifunctionality. The 
description of the case is to provide for sufficient depth to draw out what the main 
determinants of institutional change were in the case study. Subsequently, this application of 
the IoS framework makes it possible to reflect on it. The underlying question of this analysis 
is if the IoS framework provides for the adequate categories to explain changes of the 
multifunctionality of landscapes in the case study region. Moreover, it provides insights on 
how the framework could be improved for analysing the complexity of elements producing 
landscape functionality. 
For the case study a comparison will be drawn between the functions of the landscape in a 
sub-zone of the Algarve at two points in time (beginning of the seventies and the present). 
The author is unable to give an absolute assessment of landscape functions. Instead, the 
relative changes of landscape functions in between the two moments in time will be 
described. Furthermore, the author can obviously not assess the performance of all landscape 
functions equally well. Specifically, the production function did hardly disclose itself due to 
lack of data in this field. For the description of functions the study was bound by the 
limitations of the knowledge available in the public domain. The relative changes of 
landscape functions are described in a qualitative fashion; they are not valued, as often 
undertaken in function analysis (see for example, De Groot 2004; Costanza et al. 1997; 
Vanslembrouck and Van Huylenbroeck 2003) which is similarly open for subjectivity and 
uncertainty (see for example Martinez Allier and Munda 1999 on the issue of 
incommensurability of values). The author tries to overcome the lack of data by choosing a 
single case study approach in which a deep understanding was reached through extensive 
fieldwork which is documented in a related doctoral thesis (Thiel 2005). It relied on a large 
number of interviews with all relevant sectoral actors at the various levels of governance, and 
a literature and document review covering the whole period of time studied. Among other 
reasons the case study region was selected as specifically drastic changes in multifunctionality 
could be observed here (ibid. 2005). 
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The author chooses to compare today’s (2005) landscape functionality with that in the 
beginning of the seventies as this was the starting point of the ‘Europeanisation’ of Portugal. 
The case study region comprises two neighbouring councils, Silves and Albufeira in the 
Algarve. Silves has at least three times the size of Albufeira. Most of its territory is in the 
interior of the region; it has a very short coastline. Albufeira has a relatively long coastline 
with little reach into the interior14.  
  
Figure 3: Councils of the Algarve 
Source: CCDR Algarve (2005). 
 
 
Figure 4: Morphological Regions  
Source: MAOT (2000). 
                                                 
14  The three morphological zones of the region are represented in the case study region: the coastal ‘litoral’, a 
flat strip along the coast, the intermediate Barrocal, a hilly and fertile zone parallel to the coastline and the 
interior Serra, a mountainous inaccessible and rocky stretch, equally parallel to the coastline. Climate in the 
Algarve is a bit milder than in the Mediterranean. Precipitation has great inter- and intra-annual variation. In 
the case study region there are few relatively insignificant streams that sometimes dry out in the summer, and 
some coastal, relatively small aquifers. In the interior both councils have access to a very large aquifer with a 
considerable rate of recharge. 
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Below, an integrated view of the interactions between the various landscape functions is 
provided. In a second step it will be attempted to explain this account of landscape function 
changes by means of the IoS framework. Therefore, the changes in the principal transactions 
with the ecosystem will be identified and described, followed by a description of the changes 
concerning actors, property rights and governance structures. The case is presented in a way 
to provide for sufficient in-depth analysis and explanation to understand the principal 
institutional changes involved and their significance. Such a strategy claims to leave out more 
micro explanations legitimately (Scharpf 2000: 83). 
3.1 Development of the ‘Multifunctionality’ of the Case Study Region  
Without doubt the carrier function of the landscape grew immensely in significance in the 
councils of Silves and Albufeira. Transportation infrastructures, tourism facilities and 
habitation multiplied. Agricultural production on the whole decreased significantly, with only 
few types of localised production remaining. Moreover, today the landscape takes on carrier 
functions in a spatially more segmented and locally concentrated, intense fashion than in the 
beginning of the seventies. Tourism and its facilities are concentrated along the coast and its 
direct hinterland. Infrastructures and specifically transportation infrastructures are also located 
in the hinterland of the coastline. Habitation concentrates similarly on the coastline which it 
did not do before, or around the urbanised areas in the Barrocal. Agriculture is confined to the 
most suitable areas in the Barrocal which have access to water supply and which are not 
demanded by the tourism sector. Where agricultural activities continue they have been 
intensified over time through the use of irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides. Furthermore, in 
the Serra, surface water supply infrastructures are constructed to cater for the water needs of 
the tourism sector. 
These changes in the carrier function had detrimental effects on the other functions of the 
landscape: The information function deteriorated due to a disfiguration of the coastal zones 
and its hinterland and the decrease and changes in agricultural activities. The localised 
regulative and production function deteriorated due to increasing overexploitation of 
underground water resources and erosion in the coastal zones as well as in the Serra. The 
habitat function was sidelined as tourism development on the coast became predominant not 
leaving much space for anything else. In the interior specifically large surface water supply 
infrastructures as well as transport infrastructures endanger the survival of rare fauna and 
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flora. The habitat function is becoming confined to specific locations. Their maintenance is 
the outcome of increasing management efforts.  
With regard to the normative multifunctionality criteria introduced by Wiggering (1997, 
see also section 2.1) the following can be concluded: Based on the broad assessment 
described long-term conservation of biotic, abiotic and cultural resources and social 
perspectives of the rural populations have deteriorated. On the other hand, overall monetary 
welfare that is generated in the region and standard of living have improved together with the 
economic well being of the landowners. How economic well being will develop in the long 
run is difficult to say, not least as already for several years the economic performance of the 
region deteriorated slightly. Looking back this harsh trade-off was probably not necessary. 
Other promising strategies generating similar welfare benefits were envisaged at several 
points in time15. Chances are that they would have been less detrimental for functions other 
than the carrier function16. Below we look at the dynamic development of the case study 
region wondering if the specific configuration of interacting and co-determining transactions 
and activities that shape overall multifunctionality of the landscape can be made responsible 
for this outcome and how we need to analyse the institutional configuration governing it.  
In the following focus is laid upon four activities whose development dominated landscape 
change in the case study region: (1) construction and land use associated with tourism, (2) 
construction of infrastructures (of supra local significance), (3) habitat development, and, (4) 
agricultural development. The case study will be described through the IoS framework lens 
starting out with the explanandum, transactions; followed by the development of formal 
property rights, the changes in the governance structure and the features of actors in relation 
to the explanandum. This sequence is considered to provide the most accessible analytical 
presentation of the case study. The IoS framework does not in itself prescribe a specific 
sequence in which the presentation of the explanandum has to be structured. 
                                                 
15  In fact, changes in property rights and governance structures regarding land and aquifer use in the mid 
eighties and in the beginning of the nineties were to constrain both so that a greater number of functions 
could have co-existed (see also below). 
16  This judgement obviously varies in correspondence to the scale at which landscape functions are judged. 
However, while this judgement has been reached on the basis of in depth fieldwork leading to a good level of 
qualitative understanding of the region and its development. A cleaner methodology consisting of indicator, 
scale, threshold definition and the treatment of valuation issues has not been applied. However, while such a 
methodology is surely more transparent and intersubjective, it would remain subjective on a different level 
and sideline other important issues. 
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3.1.1 Transactions 
Transactions, as defined here, produce environmental problems or benefits which impinge on 
the property rights of others than those producing them. Their properties in relation to the 
period studied are stable. In the case study region the activities tourism, infrastructure 
construction, habitat development and agricultural development imply the following 
environmental problems/benefits or transactions: (a) deterioration of aquifers due to over-
abstraction originating from intense agricultural practices, golf course and green spaces 
maintenance and abstraction for consumption by individual tourists; (b) pollution of aquifers 
originates from agricultural development and maintenance of golf courses; (c) sealing of soil 
and disfiguration of the landscape originating from tourism - habitation and infrastructure 
construction of supra-local significance (here, in an exemplary fashion, infrastructures aimed 
at surface water provision are dealt with); (d) spatial decrease of habitats originating from 
tourism, habitation, infrastructure development and golf course construction; (e) maintenance 
of habitats as a result of nature conservation activities. Below, the properties of these 
transactions are characterised:  
Pollution of and abstraction from aquifers (a, b) can be dealt with jointly. It is technically 
difficult to exclude from them, while these activities harm others that also have access to the 
aquifers (rivalry). Specific assets can only be capitalised in a specific location (site and capital 
specificity) and, in the case of agricultural practices, through specific growing practices 
(knowledge specificity). The environmental problem of pollution of aquifers is inseparably 
produced and depends on the production method (agricultural practices/golf course 
maintenance). In the case of exploitation of aquifers by farmers and tourism enterprises 
jointness (inseparability) is not necessary as alternatively surface water sources could be used 
which may often not be considered to be viable and which create other environmental 
problems. In the case of abstraction of surface water excludability as well as asset specificity 
in terms of location specific investment are much higher. Pollution and overexploitation of 
aquifers are frequent, localised and small-scale transactions in the case study region. The 
problems that occur are furthermore complex, uncertain and heterogeneous in their interaction 
with the localised ecosystem and overall environmental conditions.  
The information function of the landscape is affected by the disfiguration of the landscape 
(c). This environmental problem is a pure public good (bad), which is jointly produced with 
the installation of habitation, infrastructures, tourism facilities and golf courses. The 
investments associated are site-specific, occasional and have long-term-implications. Across 
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the overall region or case study zone a considerable number of similar features occur. Their 
impact on the landscape is not complex but highly subjective. 
The sealing of the soil (c) creates an impure public bad. The groups affected are 
determined through spatial and landscape conditions. Excluding someone from its effects is 
very costly. It is an inseparable product of infrequent infrastructure and habitation 
development which imply great asset and site specificity. The emerging environmental bad 
has complex unpredictable consequences that are worsening in a cumulative fashion.  
The environmental problem of the spatial decrease of the habitat (d) or its counterpart 
habitat maintenance (e) is a pure public good that has complex uncertain implications that are 
site specific. It emerges due to site specific transactions which are infrequent in relation to one 
site but accumulate due to the extent of overall activities increasing sealing of land. 
3.1.2 Property Rights 
Property rights changed with regard to the different activities that cause environmental 
problems/benefits that the case study touches upon. Principally, property rights changes have 
been constrained through licensing and planning procedures. The development of property 
rights of the following categories of activities needs to be distinguished: (a) aquifer pollution 
and abstraction-related property rights, (b) private land use related property rights, (c) public 
land use (infrastructure) related property rights and (d) property rights in nature conservation 
areas. In the following, a very schematic description of property rights regimes in the 
beginning of the seventies and presently is provided: 
Aquifers in Portugal have always been and still are private property of the owner of the 
land above them. In the seventies no constraints existed on freely abstracting from or 
polluting aquifers. Today - and already since the beginning of the eighties in the Algarve - 
abstraction from aquifers has to be licensed with regards to quantity and conditions. 
Conditions imposed on water licenses are orientated by the regional and national water plans. 
Diffuse pollution of agriculture is unconstrained until today and diffuse pollution from golf 
course maintenance is only recently indirectly constrained. Golf course operators are to 
follow good irrigation practices minimising use of fertilizers and pesticides. Since the end of 
the nineties farmers obtain additional payments from the state if they adhere to good farming 
practices. Since the mid nineties agriculture and all other users are to be charged for water 
abstracted from aquifers. Surface waters are public property and only the state can determine 
who draws water from it.  
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In the beginning of the seventies as well as today land ownership entitles for construction. 
Formerly, it was subject to a building licence passed by the local authority on a discretionary 
basis following basic fire regulations. They were to formally constrain property rights of 
individuals. Since the beginning of the nineties licenses passed by the local authorities have to 
be in line with local and regional planning documents which are approved by the central state. 
They constrain property rights by specifying land use. In specific situations the central state 
can authorize construction independent from the valid plans. The landowner has to pay to the 
local authority for the license in relation to characteristics of the construction (size, 
commercial use or not). Furthermore, depending on the type of project it may have to undergo 
an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) which may result in requirements further 
conditioning property rights. 
In the beginning of the seventies the state did not have any constraints on developing 
infrastructures on its land. Presently, it may only do this in areas where the regional and local 
planning documents indicate the corresponding use classification for the land unless it grants 
an exception itself for reasons of national welfare. Furthermore, depending on the type of 
project it may be subject to scrutiny and alteration throughout an EIA. Construction is entirely 
prohibited in national agricultural reserves and national ecological reserves (nature 
conservation). Some of the latter reserves additionally have the status of Natura 2000 
imposing restrictive rules for project development.  
3.1.3 Governance Structures 
Governance structures supervise and sanction property rights to specific components of nature 
or organise transactions. Governance structures relate to the various categories of property 
rights at issue with regard to environmental implications in the case study. 
Broadly speaking, in the beginning of the seventies structures sanctioning and supervising 
property rights did not exist in the fields of aquifer pollution and exploitation, nature 
conservation areas, and public land use for infrastructure development. Private land use for 
construction was subject to a hierarchical governance structure, where local authorities 
determined land use features. They did this in a horizontally uncoordinated fashion. 
In the meantime, governance structures emerged for the various property rights regimes in 
place. Hierarchies are dominating relations between the public sector and private 
entities/actors. The exploitation of aquifers by farmers and tourism enterprises is subject to 
such a hierarchical regime, as well as private land use. Property rights are to follow 
programmes and plans in relation to water and land use adopted at the regional and national 
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level. They are to embed licensing practices in an overall strategy. These overall strategies 
have been subject to ‘weak’ horizontal coordination mechanisms with sectoral strategies 
impinging on the same issue17. 
The exercise of property rights in the case of agri-environmental measures is subject to a 
hybrid form where the performance of farmers in terms of aquifer pollution and abstraction is 
monitored and evaluated and financial incentives are given for adherence to good agricultural 
practices implying learning and innovation.  
Where an EIA has to be applied to a certain type of project the hierarchical granting of 
development licenses is complemented by a hybrid arrangement of horizontal and vertical 
(communicative) non-market coordination between authorities and stakeholders. It is 
combined with knowledge and information acquisition for evaluating and monitoring 
environmental performance. In case a project is co-funded by the European Commission 
additional informal governance structures (e.g. channel of knowledge and information 
exchange, learning and sometimes even informal conflict resolution) are enacted between 
stakeholders concerned and the European level.  
In instances of conflict between the regional agricultural administration funding aquifer 
exploitation and the regional environmental and water authority controlling the exploitation of 
aquifers adhoc horizontal non-market communicative coordination emerged for resolving the 
pertinent conflicts. Similarly, horizontal non-market coordination mechanisms with the aim of 
conflict resolution are applied to strategic planning exercises of outstanding regional 
significance.  
3.1.4 Actors 
The IoS framework looks at the varying actors in relation to the transactions and underlying 
activities that cause the environmental problem/benefit. Therefore, actors need to be 
distinguished with regard to transactions as well as activities. Actors will be described in a 
cursory fashion and grouped by activity. Specifically, it will be pointed towards changes in 
their characteristics over time. The attitude of actors towards the normative legitimacy of their 
actions is included. 
                                                 
17  That is, consultation and participation, yet no cross-sectoral evaluation or studies. Several plans were looked 
at, e.g., irrigation plans, land use development plans, economic development plans, and water use development 
plans. 
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Agriculture 
In the beginning of the seventies farmers operate largely independent from public sector 
intervention. They are partly responsible for the environmental problem of pollution and over-
exploitation of aquifers. Much farming was done for subsistence purposes bound by the 
limited resources of the farmers. Many farmers were analphabets, organisations or 
associations of farmers did not exist; and both had little influence on policies. Cultivating the 
land has a long tradition and the relation to the soil was significant for the identity and value 
set of farmers and their communities. Farming was not seen only as an entrepreneurial profit 
oriented activity. Sensitivity to environmental problems was and still is low. Their 
transactions are generally viewed as legitimate. 
Presently, a very limited number of the overall reduced number of farmers take an 
entrepreneurial approach. Some are educated in universities resulting in improved farming 
techniques; there are also regional development and education programmes run by the 
regional agricultural authority. Frequently old people farm for subsistence purposes. Political 
influence and degree of organisation and cooperation is still very limited and public sector 
driven.  
The regional agricultural authority principally aims at educating and improving farming 
practices for achieving rationalisation and modernisation. It funds education and 
infrastructure projects and that way continues to pursue the development of competitive 
intense irrigation agriculture in the Algarve. Most funds origin from the European Common 
Agricultural Policy mediated by the central state. Accordingly, the regional authority follows 
the European regulations where necessary. Spending funds is another paramount objective of 
the regional authorities. It operates entirely separate from other regional authorities and 
entered into disputes with environmental and water authorities several times. Its political 
weight is low. Farmers and the regional agricultural authority founded associations to self-
control their agri-environmental measures in return for funding.  
The regional environmental and water authority, which licenses the use of aquifers, has 
insufficient human, financial, and knowledge resources to actually do so. This has been 
improved only very recently. Problems associated with the pollution of aquifers are only 
recently recognised by bureaucrats. Control and enforcement of regulations has little tradition.  
Formally, regional, national and supranational environmental authorities considered it 
illegitimate if farmers and the agriculture administration did not consider implications of 
pollution and abstraction. Abstraction needs to be formally licensed and controlled. In reality 
20  Andreas Thiel 
farmers and the regional and national agricultural administration are indifferent to these 
environmental implications. Subsequent conflicts among sectoral public entities are resolved 
informally through political negotiations. Environmental NGOs (Non-Governmental 
Organisations) and agri-environmental associations consider overexploitation and over-use of 
fertilizers and pesticides illegitimate. 
Operation of Golf Courses 
In the beginning of the seventies golf courses did not exist. Presently, tourists (indirectly), 
tourism enterprises, and the regional environmental and water authority are involved into 
shaping the associated environmental problems. Algarvian tourism enterprises and policy 
makers view golf courses and so called quality tourism as strategy for improving the 
Algarve’s reputation as destination for tourists and promising income source. Before, it had 
been known only for mass tourism. Now, golf- and wealthy tourists were to be attracted 
which requires aesthetic attractiveness of the surroundings of these holidaymakers. To 
maintain almost northern European golf and park landscapes large quantities of water, 
fertilizers and pesticides are needed in Southern European climatic conditions. Many tourists 
choosing the Algarve are probably not aware of the environmental implications of this type of 
landscape management. Their concerns with regard to the quality of the region are different 
ones. According to Algarvian tourism enterprises and public actors an environmentally 
friendly image of golf courses seems to matter for the choice of destination only lately (Thiel 
2005: 182ff., 240ff.).  
Until recently, also Algarvian entrepreneurs and policy makers can be considered unaware 
of the environmental implications of this strategy. Various Algarvian actors had associated 
themselves throughout the nineties for achieving effective influence on policy making. Since 
then they effectively pushed for further water supply, tourism development, infrastructures 
and tolerance towards the environmental implications. They constructed the vision of the 
economic future of the Algarve as one of quality tourism.  
The regional environmental authority has the authority and resources to evaluate golf 
course projects in terms of their environmental implications. It imposed and enforced 
significant conditions on recent golf course developments. Very rarely it refused a license or 
inhibited it through the EIA process. Increasingly it promotes good practices for the irrigation 
of golf courses. As long as golf course operators comply the regional environmental authority 
considers their transactions as legitimate. Throughout the nineties central state authorities 
overruled regional planning legislation several times and granted permission to construct golf 
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courses. This showed the political clout of the tourism sector and economic objectives of the 
central administration/government. Environmental NGOs consider several golf course 
projects as illegitimate. They insist on their contradiction against formal norms (water 
licensing and pricing) and regional water scarcity.  
Tourism - Habitation Development 
In the beginning of the seventies northern European tourists (indirectly), tourism enterprises, 
building companies, local and national authorities were involved into the development of 
accommodation for tourists and second home-owners in the Algarve. Portuguese investors 
and entrepreneurs provided financial resources which fuelled uncontrolled tourism 
development. Local authorities aimed for short-term economic gain. The associated 
construction was viewed as legitimate. 
Recently, tourists have become either more demanding with regard to the quality of their 
accommodation or less willing to pay. Consequently higher standard accommodation as well 
as cheap package holidaying developed. At the same time demand for second homes 
increased significantly from within Portugal and the rest of Europe due to changing lifestyles 
and increasing wealth. Since the start of tourism development an economically significant 
construction sector has developed in the Algarve. Today Portuguese and international tourism 
enterprises and operators are complemented by real estate agencies. All of them are 
predominantly interested in short-term economic benefit and do not consider implications for 
environmental conservation (Thiel 2005: 241f.). They are well organised and effective in 
transmitting their agenda. Policy makers guiding public authorities tend to accommodate their 
preferences. Communicative links between public authorities and the economic sector are 
well established influencing opinion making. Furthermore, for their budgets local authorities 
depend financially on local construction tax and therefore, on an expanding tourism sector. 
Similarly, the national budget depends on prospering tourism. Tourism is one of the largest 
export sectors of the country with the perceived best strategic outlook.  
Local authorities have to license local tourism construction. Nonetheless, in many 
instances construction took place where it was not supposed to. Corruption or favouritism are 
provided as reasons. The same is alluded to with regard to instances where the national 
authority overruled plans due to paramount “national interest”. Furthermore, above-
mentioned resource constraints made the regional water authority ineffective in controlling 
water related transactions. For specific tourism projects (e.g. large accommodation projects, 
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golf courses and marinas18) an EIA has to be approved by an evaluation commission 
dominated by regional and national sectoral public authorities. Only lately these commissions 
have become more critical of the projects they evaluate. 
Many local, regional and national actors that do not have a direct stake in tourism 
development (specific public authorities and the tourism sector) meet the transactions 
involved in it with the general suspicion of illegitimacy in formal and informal terms. 
Legislation and licenses or monitoring and enforcement authorities are under the general 
suspicion of tolerating or promoting illegitimate construction. With regard to construction a 
specific problem is that a significant amount of licenses that has been granted before the 
introduction of the land use-planning regime, in 1992, continues to be valid until today.  
Infrastructure Construction 
Actors involved in infrastructure construction are considered in an exemplary fashion looking 
at surface water exploitation infrastructures (dams, pipes, treatment plants). In the beginning 
of the seventies what is now referred to as national aristocracy of water project developers 
(i.e. construction companies, the national water authority, the ministry consultancies 
agricultural authorities) jointly promoted surface water infrastructures. They considered it 
automatically economically viable and the only way to secure economic development. Water 
quality problems and ecosystemic problems were not considered. Also, little knowledge 
existed in their respect in comparison to the engineering expertise to develop surface water 
infrastructures. For financial resources they relied on public funds.  
From the eighties onwards international funding bodies became involved in funding and 
examining environmental implications of infrastructures. The ‘clients’ of these 
infrastructures, the tourism sector, local authorities and agriculture were unorganised at the  
time but they were urgently demanding for the realisation of further surface water supply 
infrastructure. Grand surface water infrastructure projects were accepted and communicated 
as only way to secure long-term economic survival. They were generally viewed as 
legitimate. 
Presently, the ‘client’ sectors of these infrastructure projects maintain the same attitude. As 
such projects necessitate an EIA the various sectoral regional and national public 
administrations and stakeholders have the opportunity to express their opinions on it. The 
                                                 
18  Golf courses and marinas have been excluded from EIAs until 1998 under Portuguese legislation. This 
legislation always breached the EU Directive for EIAs. 
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only actors opposing are the national environmental NGOs. However, they do not have the 
resources to contribute convincing knowledge to alter the decisions taken. All studies were 
commissioned by the same public sector actors that favoured surface water supply 
infrastructure development.  
Specifically the European Commission co-funds surface water supply infrastructure (dams, 
water treatment plants and distribution pipes. Consequently, its environmental directorate has 
to assess its compatibility with European environmental regulations. It has resources to 
produce data for this purpose. It can inhibit co-funding as well as it can inhibit construction 
where regulations are not complied with. Driven by the environmental NGOs they evaluate 
the environmental implications of a specific dam project in the case study region (Odelouca 
dam) in-depth. However, due to good informal relations of the regional and national actors to 
the European Commission the latter does not declare the project illegal although it withdraws 
its financial contribution. The national project owners, in turn, use their authoritative and 
financial resources backed up by the majority of the population and press ahead with the 
construction of the dam in what has meanwhile been declared a Natura 2000 area. 
Nature Conservation 
Nature conservation activities did not exist explicitly in the region in the beginning of the 
seventies. Today, it is principally a matter of land use. The question is what types of land use 
may occur in specific kinds of nature conservation areas. The national environmental 
authorities designate nature conservation areas, and regional environmental authorities make 
sure they are complied with. In case an area has the status of a Natura 2000 site a project has 
to be of national interest to be licensed. The public authorities have capacities to attain 
knowledge about project implications and they can steer the final judgment of the evidence in 
the EIA through nominating the evaluation commission. Environmental NGOs are the 
principal defendants of nature conservation areas. On the other hand, many regional actors, 
such as farmers, local authorities and tourism developers view this type of transaction (nature 
conservation) as illegitimate in informal terms. They defend the normative view of the 
paramount role of land ownership with which the state should not interfere and argue for the 
need for economic development which nature conservation should not inhibit.  
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4 The IoS Framework and Evaluation of the Case Study 
In the first half of the nineties the case study region was subject to changes in property rights 
and governance structures specifically in relation to aquifers, land use, public infrastructure 
projects and nature conservation as specific form of land use. Hierarchical licensing regimes 
guided by strategic planning documents were introduced. They aimed to steer land use 
development in the case study region into a more sustainable (multifunctional) path 
constraining and guiding construction and tourism development as well as aquifer pollution 
and limiting the overexploitation of aquifers. They have been introduced in a top down 
fashion. Many of them transposed European Directives. Some of them had their origin before 
Portuguese membership in the EU. On the national and regional level transposition and 
implementation efforts were characterised by considerable inertia.  
Using the IoS framework we can single out five factors explaining the lack of enforcement 
of the licensing regime constraining water abstraction: (1) the costs of enforcement increase 
as regulations become tighter and even further as the frequency of transactions increases (2) 
the resources of the entities responsible for enforcement are very limited, (3) the normative 
values of farmers as well as local authorities and tourism enterprises support abstraction 
without licensing. (4) Lack of understanding for its environmental implications, even inside of 
the enforcement authority and the traditional normative and belief system supports this. 
Finally, (5) contributing to the environmental problem is the lack of horizontal coordination 
mechanisms between the environmental authority controlling abstraction and the agricultural 
administration supporting it in an almost uncontrolled fashion. The long-term implications are 
complex and uncertain, and knowledge about them hardly exists. 
With regard to the failure of the construction licensing regime to constrain building 
activities the following elements explain the environmental damage according to the IoS 
framework: it is the aim of the constrained (tourism developers) as well as the constraining 
actors (local and national public authorities) to promote construction as both gain a short term 
profit which suits their goals and profit orientation. Furthermore, it suits their normative 
evaluation of the entitlements land ownership provides. Also, costs of implementing the 
construction licenses regime are high. Additionally, transactions increase in frequency as 
more construction takes place, and the implications of building and their cumulative effects 
are complex and uncertain. Knowledge about them only starts to emerge. 
Habitats are decreased in size as existing normative values of all actors with political and 
financial resources pay no respect to them. Furthermore, value orientations of these actors 
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prescribe short term profit maximising while the benefits of habitat conservation are complex 
and uncertain. The only actors defending habitats, the environmental NGOs, have no 
resources to provide knowledge about its implications, to influence political processes 
significantly and to physically preserve habitats themselves.  
Changes in (formal) property rights can be summarized as follows: Property rights changes 
introduced in the case study region can only be enforced if the actor enforcing them disposes 
of the necessary resources. However, in the case study region implementation costs are 
beyond the available means of the authorities. Furthermore, the specific relation of norms and 
modes of valuation of constrained and constraining actors in hierarchical relationships is 
significant. Their similarity and contradiction to formal rules in the case study region lead to 
the ineffectiveness of the formal property rights regime. Therefore, in the case study region 
actor features (financial and political resources, norms and orientations), costs of 
implementation, rise in transactions costs due to a rise in number of transactions, and their 
complex, uncertain implications were decisive for the ineffectiveness of the changes in 
property rights. Below, it is furthermore referred to the role of contextual features. 
It can be concluded that the landscape in the Algarve developed not as sustainable as it 
possibly could have, specifically in environmental terms. The IoS framework helps to explain 
what role the institutional configuration of property rights, governance structures, and actors 
play in relation to transactions. In the following the question is dealt with if the IoS 
framework provides the adequate conceptual toolkit for reconstructing and explaining the 
effects of socio-ecological interactions on the multifunctionality of landscapes in the case 
study. 
Despite some complementary suggestions, which will be elaborated in the following 
section, the IoS framework provides a valuable contribution to the explanation of the role of 
the institutional configuration for socio-ecological interactions shaping multifunctionality. 
Being an elaborated analytical framework it proved useful for the analysis of the institutional 
setting governing multifunctional landscapes. Transactions shaping multifunctional 
landscapes could be perceived to be more complex than those shaping  
agri-environmental problems. Therefore, the object of study may have been too complex to 
apply the IoS framework to its empirical study. However, this fear could not be confirmed. 
While the framework necessitates in-depth data collection and understanding of the 
institutional configuration, the categories it proposes provide a comprehensive and adequate 
explanation of the outcome of their interaction. A similar assessment of the framework is 
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suggested in the application of the framework to agri-environmental practices as undertaken 
by other authors (Rauchenecker 2003; Schleyer 2004). 
5 Lessons: Taking the IoS Framework Further in the Context of 
Multifunctionality  
Two aspects of the application of the framework seem to specifically merit changes: firstly, it 
does not preview the distinction between formal and informal property rights and governance 
structures. However, this distinction can clearly be made in the case study. On the other hand 
the framework provides the actor and transaction related categories to adequately explain the 
co-existence of formal and informal property rights and governance structures. Contextual 
factors are important here. Secondly, the framework overdetermines the emerging 
multifunctionality of the landscape in the case study region. In other words, it cannot be 
clearly distinguished if transactions, property rights, actor, governance structure or even 
context related features were decisive for the emergent Algarvian landscape. Somewhat 
vaguely it has to be assumed that the specifically negative performance of the Algarvian 
landscape in terms of multifunctionality is the result of these contingently overlapping factors 
characterising a ‘specifically unsustainable’ institutional configuration. This analytical 
problem can only be overcome by comparative case studies where single categories vary. In 
fact, from own experience, the author would argue that such co-determining and mutually re-
enforcing dynamics are frequently discovered when an in-depth understanding of case studies 
is achieved. To some extent this again hints at the possible existence of common underlying 
causes, which were not uncovered by the analytical framework used. However, due to the 
almost ever-present dialectical interrelations of cause and effect in social science research 
often singling out one underlying cause does not represent much more than a conceptual 
preference of the analyst.  
Nonetheless, contextual factors seem to be undervalued in the framework. This becomes 
specifically clear when the framework is applied to multifunctional landscapes as they are 
shaped by multiple connected and interdependent transactions. Therefore, here the need is 
reinforced to conceptualise and detail the relation between contextual factors and the IoS 
framework configuration (see also Ostrom 2005, chapter 9).  
A significant problem is how to delimit the context of the IoS framework. The delimitation 
of context depends on the transaction looked at and the contingent institutions involved in it. 
Therefore, it covers the transactions and institutional configurations and actors that are not 
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directly related to a specific transaction but that are of great relevance to their analysis. 
Delimitating context this way gives it an outstanding importance for a synthesised 
understanding of what shapes multifunctionality of landscapes. There might be few or only 
one contextual factor that explains the institutional performance across the IoS configurations 
governing various interdependent transactions due to interdependent environmental problems. 
Due to its interdependent effects this could be of specific interest for the analysis of 
institutional performance in regard to landscapes. Hereby, specific attention should be paid to 
commonalities between factors influencing improper implementation of formal property 
rights across various transactions. Such common factors could explain cross-transaction 
institutional performance in a specific setting. Knowledge about them would be specifically 
valuable for initiating institutional re-configuration through designing or crafting potentially 
more adequate institutions. 
For example, one significant contextual factor in the case study responsible for aggravating 
environmental problems is the insufficient performance of the institutional configuration that 
is reinforced across a number of transactions. It is not specific to one transaction, therefore it 
pertains to significant contextual factors which explain performance and which are of specific 
relevance to the case of multifunctionality of landscapes. Overexploitation of aquifers is 
promoted by the fact that property rights for land use are not adequately implemented, which 
further aggravates the cumulative problem emerging from failure of the water control regime 
to work. Moreover, land use development in terms of tourism habitation is equally supported 
by infrastructure development accommodating it. Infrastructure development, in turn, is 
facilitated by the ineffective constraints on property rights through EIA and the lenient 
enforcement of special protection areas.  
The described configuration resembles a system of loops mutually reinforcing 
environmental problems within and across a variety of functions. The interconnection is given 
by the mutual interdependence of the transactions19. Such interdependence of institutional 
configurations as well as the mentioned accumulation effects should be taken into account in 
the analysis of institutions governing multifunctional landscapes. The dominant or subdued 
relationship of one transaction to the other or one institutional configuration over the other 
should be characterised. The outcome of such an analysis may be that the underlying cause of 
the performance of one institutional configuration is the institutional configuration governing 
                                                 
19  E.g., tourism development implies the exploitation of water, the construction of habitation, the decrease in 
habitats, and the provision of certain transport infrastructures and facilities. 
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another connected transaction. This category (1) interdependence of institutional 
configurations due to interconnected transactions and the relative ranking of institutions 
describes the case specific context of transactions in which institutions operate and the 
likelihood of the emergence of environmental problems/benefits. These interdependent 
transactions could even be ranked according to the significance of institutional performance 
and in relation to normative values or logical interlinkages.  
To illustrate this with the case study: property of land legitimates disposing of it at will, 
therefore, even formally illegitimate construction for tourism is undertaken and accepted. 
Once accommodation is developed normative values prescribe that water supply is to follow 
which implies further exploitation of aquifers. Therefore, unrestrained disposition of land 
property due to the related institutional configuration and values of actors is at the heart of the 
unsustainable development land use, decrease of habitats as well as water exploitation 
deteriorating a variety of land use functions (information, production, regulative function). 
The institutional performance in terms of land management is therefore more significant than 
that governing the abstraction of aquifers for understanding the unsustainable development of 
the case study region in terms of multifunctionality. Such contextual information regarding 
the (2) significance of institutional configurations can specifically inform institutional design 
efforts. 
The comparison of the configuration of institutions governing interconnected socio-
ecologic transactions (in terms of factors outlined by the IoS framework) shows the following 
similarities: (a) lack of resources of public authorities to enforce formal property rights, (b) 
uncertainty due to lack of knowledge and complexity of environmental problems, (c) 
similarity of normative evaluation and mode of calculation of those constraining property 
rights, and (d) all politically significant actors and those constrained (short term profit 
orientation by all actors significant for transactions and little valuation of the environment). 
Case study evidence shows that this common evaluation is partly related to the predominant 
political economic significance of the tourism sector for economic development in the region 
(in terms of employment, economic welfare and national terms of trade). This contextual 
factor seems to be of paramount significance for understanding the unsustainable 
development of the landscape in the Algarve. It is complemented by the gap between formal 
property rights of actors, which are implemented in a top down fashion, and their actual 
property rights which are strongly embedded socially due to deeply rooted normative values 
actors hold. Furthermore, those constrained (entrepreneurs) have traditionally significant 
scope for political influence on those constraining (local and regional authorities). Overall 
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institutional reconfiguration has been launched in a top down fashion with the origin at the 
EU level. So far its effect on the existing informal institutions was limited.  
Based on this example contextual factors are suggested that provide insights into 
underlying causes: (2) political economic context in regard to different transactions and, the 
discrepancy between enacted and formal property rights due to a disembedded re-shaping of 
formal property rights which is to re-shape the exercise of property rights on the ground 
which are culturally rooted and economically founded.  
Specifically as part of function analysis for characterising the context it seems to be 
essential to analyse the overall societal attitude to the various functions of the landscape 
which may be influenced by the association of specific landscapes with people’s identities. 
Societal attitude is assumed to be related to the political economic context and (3) socially 
and culturally conditioned evaluations of transactions/ functions. For the case of the Algarve 
there is little doubt that the Portuguese population, the tourism sector and the public sector 
valued short-term economic profit generated from the carrier function higher than the 
information, production, regulation and habitat function of the landscape. This is founded on 
an economic reality shaping politics as well as on deeply rooted attitudes to the legitimacy 
land ownership provides. However, looking closely at the evidence, the habitat function is 
recently considered to a larger extent specifically by the tourism and public sectors It is 
perceived to yield heightened economic benefit in the future due to changes in tourism 
demand. Similarly, the regulation function is being considered to a greater extent as its 
deterioration threatened economic survival of the region. The lack and bad quality of drinking 
water for example as well as the pollution of coastal waters threatened the physical 
subsistence of the tourism industry as well as the image of the Algarve as tourism destination. 
Both are essential ‘resources’ the Algarvian tourism industry capitalizes on. Therefore, in the 
Algarve a changed perception of opportunities for profit lately changed economic demands 
and political priorities and therefore also socio-ecological transactions.  
Further contextual factors that explain prevalent value sets and evaluative frameworks 
which are decisive for commonalities across institutional configurations concerning various 
transactions are (4) agency features. Independent from their position or role, agency or actors’ 
specific attitudes are of vital importance for understanding the performance of the institutional 
configuration. A large degree of consistency of agency orientation in the Algarve among 
management and enforcement agencies origins from recruitment mechanisms. National 
ministers adopt a strong role in filling in key positions in the national and regional public 
sector. Centralised political leadership and competence therefore have an extraordinary role 
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due to relatively weak, politically dependent bureaucracies. Therefore agency features of 
political and sometimes administrative leadership are of great contextual significance as well 
as factors determining or “filtering” agency features influencing collective actors involved, 
such as recruitment or education.  
Finally, (5) the need to take institutional and physical time lags into account has to be 
stressed for adequately applying the IoS framework and identifying what are normative 
Institutions of Sustainability and distinguishing them from ‘Institutions of (less or Un-) 
sustainability’. Hagedorn (2003, 2005) alludes to the significance of these issues as well. As 
noted above, the IoS framework describes a spatially and temporally contingent institutional 
configuration shaping socio-ecological transactions which produce the physical environment. 
However, for evaluating if an institutional configuration provides for sustainability the time 
lag of environmental problem manifestation has to be taken into account which emerges due 
to persistence of former institutional orders. Taking a dynamic view similarly physical time 
lags in environmental problem manifestation have to be considered. In the case study these 
issues are highlighted by the fact that many of the building licenses have been granted 
legitimately under the former institutional configuration before a hierarchical system of 
planning instruments was introduced. They continue to entitle for building - and thus, 
aggravating environmental problems - for years to come (institutional time lag). On the other 
hand in the case of aquifers the regeneration time of aquifers is very long, so that a new 
institutional order can only provide for better, more sustainable status and use of the aquifers 
in the long run (physical time lag). The application of the IoS framework to a dynamic 
development needs to take account of these intertemporal institutional and physical 
interdependencies and it needs to deal with them conceptually and methodologically. They 
are of great importance for adequately evaluating the performance of institutional 
configurations. As normative Institutions of Sustainability are contingent on a specific 
environmental problem the development trend of the activities and transactions governed 
should be characterised as well as the longevity of the environmental and coordination 
problem they produce. This dynamic view including time lags and comprising contextual and 
case specific information is of specific relevance for correctly judging the performance of 
institutional configurations governing socio-ecological interactions. Their consideration is 
essential for deriving normative Institutions of Sustainability.  
Furthermore, similarly useful for extending the IoS framework towards a dynamic view is 
the introduction of the category of transition costs (costs of implementation of changes in 
property rights). Discrepancies between formal and informal rules may well be linked to high 
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transition costs which are not explicitly considered by Hagedorn as described above. 
Nonetheless, transition costs20 characterising path dependency were of great importance for 
explaining the institutional performance and persistence of informal property rights in the 
case study.  
6 Conclusions 
This paper combined De Groot’s function analysis and Hagedorn’s IoS framework for 
explaining how institutional configurations that govern socio-ecologic transactions produce 
and change (multifunctional) landscapes. The combination of these conceptual tools was 
applied to a subregion of the Algarve in Portugal. In view of the case study region it was 
subsequently focussed on the evaluation of the IoS framework for analysing institutions and 
their role in multifunctional landscapes. Summarising it, the IoS framework has proven 
valuable for analysing and explaining the way the institutional configuration shaped 
multifunctionality. Problematic is its lack to distinguish between formal and informal 
elements characterising institutions. Furthermore, unresolved is the fact that it overdetermines 
the physical outcome, so that clear cause and effect relationships cannot be established. The 
IoS framework acknowledges contextual factors, whose role is specifically stressed for 
reconstructing how the cross-transaction institutional configuration shapes multifunctionality 
of landscapes. In this regard several issues were pointed out which should be empirically 
described and conceptually further developed. Specifically, the conceptualisation of 
intertransaction and cross-institutional relations should be developed as well as the role of 
specific context variables, such as cross-jurisdictional agency features, agency selection 
processes (recruitment), political economic issues and a view of the relative societal valuation 
of landscape functions based on political economic and cultural setting should be introduced. 
Furthermore, introducing a dynamic perspective into the IoS framework and for adequately 
reflecting the performance of institutional configurations in relation to the physical 
environment specific attention should be paid to physical and institutional time lags between 
causes and effects of environmental problems and benefits as well as the notion of transition 
costs as conceptualised by Challen (2000). 
                                                 
20  Costs of institutional change which in the case study were equivalent to costs of implementation of formal 
property rights. 
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